Monthly Archives: November 2014

European Court awards big damages to Ukraine businessmen in murky cases

Graham Stack in Berlin for Business New Europe ( November 28, 2014

Over the last year, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has found against the Ukrainian state in cases dating back to the murky 1990s and awarded tens of millions of euros in damages to controversial businessmen, raising questions whether it is a suitable adjudicator for such disputes.

On January 23, the EHCR found in favour of Irish aviation firm East/West Alliance Ltd against Ukraine, in a case concerning the violation of the Irish company’s right to “peaceful possession of goods.” Ordering the Ukraine government to pay €5mn in damages to East/West, the court ruled that the Irish firm “has been deprived by the State of its fourteen aircraft in an unlawful and arbitrary manner,” which along with financial loss may also have prompted “feelings of helplessness and frustration” on the part of management, the court ruled.

East/West, according to the case materials, was at the time of its confiscation by the Ukrainian state in 2001 part of Kyiv-based Titan Concern, which was controlled by former Ukrainian MP Anatoly Liovin, and centred around air freight operator ATI.

Anti-arms trafficking groups see Liovin’s ATI in a very different light than does the EHCR, and question whether the damages awarded by a human rights court to Liovin are morally appropriate. Because at the time of the confiscation, ATI was a leading operator of charter flights from Uganda to rebel-held territories in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), according to a report “The Arms Fliers”, co-authored by anti-arms trafficking NGOs IPIS and TransArms in 2011. The DRC was wracked by a civil war 1998-2002 that was fuelled by Uganda and other neighbours, who sent in arms, fighters and supplies by air, and brought out precious minerals. The war cost an estimated 3m lives.

Thus ATI was close to the scene of horrendous human rights abuses. “We believe that no matter what you transported, aiding and supporting or exploiting a military invasion bears a certain level of responsibility,” TransArms’ Sergio Finardi, one of the authors of the “Arms Flyers” report, tells bne.

Liovin denied any involvement in illegal arms cargoes or the transport of looted goods, in an interview with bne at the time when he applied to have the ECHR hear his case. “We carried mostly humanitarian cargoes and food,” he said, although Ukraine’s database of litigation shows that Liovin-controlled firms indeed had contracts with state arms exporters at least in the Middle East.

In 2002, Liovin was the subject of an investigation by Ukraine’s parliamentary anti-organised crime committee, headed by renowned mafia-buster Hrihory Omelchenko. The investigation, seen by bne  in the archives of the Verkhovna Rada, detailed payments made to East/West Alliance 1999-2001 from a slush fund close to then president Leonid Kuchma, for arms cargoes transported by Liovin for state arms trader Ukrspetseksport.

Tax problems

The tax case brought by Ukraine in 2001 against East/West Alliance and ATI quickly led to the closure of ATI, Liovin told bne. “We had operations ranging from Azerbaijan to Mexico,” he said, “and all this was lost because of the government.” The case brought by Ukraine’s tax service in 2001 focused on the relationship between the offshore company East/West– on paper the owner of ATI’s planes, but lacking any office or staff – and ATI, which leased its fleet from the Irish company. Tax inspectors claimed this lease agreement was a fiction that allowed ATI to evade taxes by transferring profits to the Irish company.

The tax authorities confiscated planes belonging to East/West based in Ukraine and operated by ATI, along with ownership documents for the planes found on the premises of ATI.

Liovin fought his corner, getting elected to parliament in 2002. He became deputy head of the parliamentary transport committee, through which he headed a parliamentary investigation into a supposed ‘crisis in the aviation industry’ that authorised him to seal the confiscated aircraft, according to the case materials, thus delaying their sale.

During this time he also won a series of Ukrainian court decisions backing his case that the planes should be returned. Ukraine failed to implement those decisions, allowing him to appeal to the ECHR.

But even after the closure of ATI, during the period of the application to the ECHR Liovin’s planes continued to arouse controversy. In 2009, a report from the UN expert group on the DRC detailed that Liovin supplied three transport aircraft to the DRC army in 2008, with expired service lives, faulty paperwork and without notifying the UN as required. Liovin laid the blame elsewhere. “This is the fault of Antonov design bureau [the plane’s manufacturer] for utterly failing to provide adequate after-sales service,” he said.

Yet in 2013, a former director of Kherson airport, controlled by Liovin, was sentenced to jail for receiving an undeclared militarised An-26 transport plane flown in from Uzbekistan for repairs, and owned by a Liovin company registered in the United Arab Emirates.

Liovin claimed damages of over $166mn against Ukraine, making the €5mn award seem a token payment. But one dissenting opinion – regarding only the damages – queried the award. “There are elements in the file which suggest that the amount of €5mn may be much higher than the total price paid by the applicant company for the aircraft in 1999 and 2000,” ECHR Judge Paul Lemmens wrote.

“We won the case with a unanimous decision – and it couldn’t have been any other way. The damages awarded as they stand are purely symbolic,” Liovin tells bne in an email. Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice tells bne that: “We will do everything we can to transfer this money in the allotted time.”

Virtual economy

The damages given to East/West Alliance are dwarfed by the ECHR’s award of €27mn in September 2013 to the Ukrainian company Agrokompleks – the biggest ever award by the court to a Ukrainian plaintiff, and one of the biggest in its history.

“The whole proceedings [of the Ukrainian state] with this company were openly unjust – there were facts shocking in their unconcealed absence of respect to the courts on the part of the highest officials in the state,” Ganna Yudkivska, Ukraine’s judge on the ECHR, commented to the press in 2013. “For instance,” Yudivska explained, “the case materials include a moment when then president of Ukraine appealed to the head of the Supreme Arbitration Court and indicated how the case should be decided – and the chairman of the court gave a written response that this had been performed.”

The €27mn award in 2013 refers to a contract drawn up originally between two Soviet enterprises signed two weeks before Ukraine even became independent, on December 18, 1991, with subsequent additional contracts. On the plaintiff side was Agrokompleks, “a private company based in Ukraine which dealt, at the time of the events, with Russian companies involved in barter trade operations, such as exchanging Ukrainian raw foodstuffs for Russian crude oil and further sale of finished oil products,” according to a statement by the ECHR in 2011.

On the other was the Ukrainian state-owned Lynos, which operated the Lissichansk oil refinery, the largest in the country at the time. It ran up debts in the first half of the 1990s towards Agrokompleks and other suppliers for crude oil it processed. The situation was exacerbated by direct orders from top officials to the refinery to channel fuel to farmers as a social measure, despite the fuel being pledged as payment for crude supplies from Agrokompleks. It was these direct orders that strengthened the Agrokompleks case against Ukraine.

In the context of the time, the dispute was less shocking: the post-Soviet aftermath was shaped by what US economist Clifford Gaddy called the “virtual economy,” based on “an illusion about almost every important parameter.” Cash-free barter relations and payment arrears were the norm, and traders often supplied inputs to insolvent state-owned companies, growing the debts as a tool to take over the plants. Agrokompleks was such an intermediary in import-export barter chains.

The history of the Lynos’ debt to Agrokompleks is thus also a history of struggle for control over Ukraine’s strategically crucial refinery, accounting for 35% of Ukraine’s fuel supply at the time. While the €27mn paid out to Agrokompleks in 2013 may have been record compensation for a Ukrainian case, it was only a fraction of the total €180mn in debt claimed by Agrokompleks, but this debt again was a fraction of the value of the refinery over which Agrokompleks sought control.

Agrokompleks founded the committee of Lynos creditors in 1997. But successive Ukrainian governments accused Agrokompleks of inflating the size of the Lynos debt by as much as ten-fold, and fought off the privatisation bid.

In 2001, the government finally sold Lynos to the Russian oil company TNK, which was capable of supplying crude to the refinery on a stable basis. Agrokompleks then filed its claim with the ECHR.

Pyrrhic victory

Agrokompleks’ claim against Ukraine is also challenged by arguments that the debt was not Agrokompleks’ to claim: the company simply lucked out, as the last link in a chain of barter transactions supplying crude oil to the refinery, and receiving payment in kind, such as fuel and food products.

A Russian oil trading firm from the early 1990s, Gefes International, claims that it supplied crude oil to Agrokompleks for the Lynos refinery. “That was our oil which was to be processed to fuel and returned to us, and Agrokompleks was nothing but a go-between,” head of Gefes International, Evgenny Fedosov, tells bne.

The driving force behind Agrokompleks was prominent Ukrainian businessman Oleksandr Galkin. After losing out on privatising the Lissichansk refinery, Galkin focused on growing his packaging business, Ukrplastic, based on a privatised chemicals plant. Galkin developed a flourishing business, gaining a good reputation for enlightened entrepreneurialism and technological modernisation, including funding from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In 2005, Gefes International brought a lawsuit against Agrokompleks over the oil supplied to Lynos, and won damages of around $20mn, but the decision was later overturned, and finally thrown out in a series of decisions in 2013-14.

“The money Galkin claimed from Ukraine, was money he owed to us, because that oil was ours,” Fedosov told bne, calling Galkin “a fraudster” who had once tried to have him arrested in Kyiv. In an earlier interview, Fedosov claimed Galkin had bought Ukrplastic “with other people’s money.”

Fedosov is currently head of Smolenergy, an oil refining company linked to a “pump and dump” stock market scam in the US in 2007, which led to prosecutions in Germany.

In the 1990s, Fedosov’s Gefes International was linked to Ingush businessman Mikhail Gutseriev, who ran Russian state-owned oil producer Slavneft. Fedosov said he financed the oil deal with a loan from Sayan Bank, a regional Russian linked to the controversial Israeli traders Mikhail and Lev Chorny, which was closed for money laundering in 1996.

Other traders supplied crude oil to Lynos in the first half of the 1990s, although it is not known if they worked with Agrokompleks. In 1993, the Vienna-based company Nordex GmbH – reported by the CIA at the time to be an organised crime syndicate – secured a massive Russian-Ukrainian barter deal to supply Lynos with crude oil, temporarily even taking office space in a Ukrainian government building.

Mysterious death

Galkin, while celebrating the ECHR courtroom victory in 2011, did not live to see the final decision on damages in October 2013. bne can reveal that on May 10, 2013 he was crushed under a 38-tonne truck whilst strolling with his common-law wife and co-owner of Agrokompleks, in the picturesque village of Roquebrune-Cap-Martin on France’s Cote d’Azure. He died after two hours of futile attempts to extract him from under the wheels.

His death was subsequently hushed up in Ukraine, where he is still featured on the Ukrplastic website as president.

According to eyewitness accounts cited in press reports from France, which referred to Galkin only as a “Russian tourist,” the truck that hit him was registered in the former Soviet state of Lithuania and it was manoeuvring dangerously, paying no heed to honking cars. Police on the scene told the press they would charge the driver with manslaughter.

roquebrune galkin death Was Galkin struck down by the Russian mob, motivated by the ECHR damages and debts from the 1990s? “A criminal investigation is underway under the offices of a judge… Secrecy of investigation forbids me to say more,” the state prosecutor for Nice, Eric Bedos, tells bne.

Agrokompleks and Ukrplastic itself have said nothing about Galkin’s death. “We do not comment on these topics,” an Ukrplastic spokesperson tells bne, referring to the circumstances of Galkin’s death and the Agrokompleks court cases.

“Oleksandr Galkin is featured there as the company’s founder,” the company said, with reference to Galkin’s continued presence on its website.  Galkin’s widow, and new Ukrplastic CEO, Irina Mirochnik, declined to comment.

Fedosov too has since adopted a civil tone. While acknowledging that investigators had enquired about his relations with Galkin, he says: “I don’t have a bad word to say about Sasha [Oleksandr] Galkin… But he had a lot of enemies, because he had a lot of debts.”

Poor judge

Inevitably, such cases have raised questions about the ECHR’s adjudication of post-Soviet business-state relations, which cannot always be readily translated into Western categories. International courts such as the ECHR are “exposed to the risk of fraud and money laundering,” and should do “at least a cursory review of entities and beneficiaries with high money laundering risk, before awarding damages,” believes money-laundering expert Saskia Rietbroek, of AML Services International. “Awards paid out to companies with unknown beneficiaries, in countries with shocking levels of corruption such as Ukraine, are vulnerable to money laundering because they may be reinvested in criminal enterprises,” Rietbroek warns.


Smuggling suspicions and organized crime cast shadow over Ukraine’s defence industry

Graham Stack in Kyiv for Business New Europe (
November 18, 2014


The shadow of organized crime hangs over Ukraine’s defence industry. bne investigations trace links between gangs and the defence sector that stretch back over 20 years of arms smuggling to places like Iran and North Korea.

Ukraine’s military prosecutors and the SBU security service in early November searched the houses and offices of former and current heads of the state arms exporter Ukrspetseksport, and seized documents from a number of state defence firms, pointing to a crackdown on the traditionally murky defence sector by Ukraine’s new reform-minded authorities.

The moves follow an October raid by the SBU – backed up by an elite SWAT unit – on the head office of Ukraine’s state arms holding Ukroboroprom. The crackdown sparked hopes that Ukraine may be finally getting serious about pushing organised crime out of its arms industry, although there is no confirmed information as to what investigators are looking for.

The latest shock to Ukraine’s defence sector came in 2013, when UN investigators named a Ukrainian aviation executive in connection with the illegal attempted transfer in 2009 of around $16m worth of rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and man-portable air-defense systems from North Korea to Iran – even though both countries are under an international arms embargo.

The attempted transfer grabbed world attention in December 2009 when Thai authorities seized an Ilyushin-76 plane numbered 4L-AWA at Bangkok airport, and found it stuffed with the North Korean arms bound for Iran apparently via Ukraine – the first cargo of North Korean weapons to have been seized under sanctions. Then the paper chase began: according to its documents, the plane was owned by a little-known Georgian operator Air West Georgia, leased by a New Zealand shell company, SP Trading, and chartered by a Hong Kong firm.

But investigators quickly traced the plane back to its previous owner from Kazakhstan, Aleksandr Zykov, whose local firm East Wing allegedly supplied the crew, with Air West Georgia and the Hong Kong charter both smoke screens. Zykov had a past history linking him to sanctions busting arms transfers.

That left only the New Zealand shell company SP Trading to account for. And in 2013 the UN investigation produced a surprise, by alleging that an unknown Ukrainian, Yury Lunov, had masterminded the transport together with Zykov.

But while Zykov’s role as provider of the plane seems clear, what was Lunov’s? The trail leads to a small office in Kyiv: A fax number provided for SP Trading in the cargo documents matches the number provided in Ukraine’s company register for an obscure local firm called GST Ukraine, which Lunov also told a UN panel was his place of work.

A guest of GST

GST Ukraine is registered at Frunze Street 19-21 in Kyiv’s Podil district. Embarrassingly for Ukraine, the address is the seat of the country’s State Service for Export Control – the very state body that controls the export and import of military technologies. The address – a former Soviet government department building – also houses the state-owned Ukrainian Cargo Airways, the country’s largest freight carrier, and state-owned Ukraine Scientific Research Institute for Aviation Technology. Thus it forms a trinity of air transport, dual-use technologies and export controls, around which a whole swathe of smaller, often private companies such as GST Ukraine have sprouted up.

GST Ukraine’s current office lies behind an unmarked door in an adjacent building, which also houses the very hush-hush Ukraine Scientific Research Institute for Aviation Technology (UkrNIIAT). bne found GST Ukraine’s director, Vyacheslav Kaplunenko, at his workplace in a cluttered one-room office. According to the state company register, Kaplunenko has run the company since its founding in 2004, with Yury Lunov’s son Boris a co-owner.

Responding to bne questions, Kaplunenko calls GST Ukraine an “air freight” business. When asked what projects they were currently working on, Kaplunenko complains that, “there is no work at the moment. Due to the war in the country, we just sit and read the news. When will it all end?”

Kaplunenko claims Yury Lunov – named by the UN in connection with the 2009 North-Korea to Iran arms deal – no longer works at GST Ukraine, adding that Lunov handled the aviation side of the business, while he only ran the commercial side. Kaplunenko also says he knows of no investigation into his company.

Kaplunenko insists GST Ukraine has no business relationship with the State Export Controls Committee, UkrNIIAT, Ukrainian Cargo Airways or any other state organisations. “The only relationship we have is purely commercial, being that we rent the office from UkrNIIAT,” Kaplunenko says, adding it was a “coincidence” that GST Ukraine was in the same line of business as its landlord and larger neighbours. UkrNIIAT, contacted later by telephone, also denied that GST Ukraine was connected, saying they rent office space to a number of firms.

But belying such words, Kaplunenko’s office is full of files suggesting he works directly for Ukraine’s state defence sector, labelled, for instance, “Ukrspetseksport” and “Yuzhmashavia” – the former the state arms trader, the latter an aviation company owned by Ukraine’s producer of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Yuzhmash. “Folders are folders, they don’t say what’s inside,” Kaplunenko shrugs. The wall of Kaplunenko’s office displays a poster detailing munitions and packaging sizes. “It’s a souvenir,” he explains.

The Kazakh operator linked to the plane seized in Bangkok in 2009, East Wing, was originally named GST Aero, a close match to GST Ukraine. UN experts in 2013 wrote that GST Ukraine is “an entity that the Panel has reason to believe is related to [Kazakh operator] Zykov.” Apart from the 2009 case, UN experts have linked Zykov’s GST Aero/East Wing to deliveries of arms, ammunition and vehicles to Somalia in 2006, Chad in 2007 and to Darfur rebels in 2008.

Moreover, the GST Ukraine fax number matches both that of the New Zealand shell company SP Trading as well as that of Air West Georgia, which the UN calls a “ghost operator.”

Kaplunenko denies that his company has any relationship to Air West Georgia. But one folder on Kaplunenko’s shelf bore the registration number of a single plane, an Antonov 12B, registration number 4L-BKN. Aviation databases show this plane to be a sister to the 4L-AWA plane seized in Bangkok – also on paper operated by Air West Georgia, but currently in storage near Kyiv.

Kaplunenko hems and haws when queried about the plane, and then decides it is time for your correspondent to leave his office, haranguing the guard on the way out for having admitted a “CIA spy” to the premises.

Blast from the past

GST Ukraine was set up in 2004 at Frunze 19-21, but this was not Lunov and Kaplunenko’s first acquaintance with the address: records show that both men in the 1990s were shareholders in another company at the same address run by Lunov called Antonov Aerotrack-Aviaservice, the subsidiary of a major cargo flyer at the time called Antonov Aerotrack Aviation. “You’ve done your homework,” Kaplunenko acknowledges.

Despite being wound up in 2001, Aerotrack Limited at the Frunze 19-21 address was listed as consignee on the waybill for the 2009 4L-AWA flight.

In the 1990s, the CIA accused Antonov Aerotrack of having flown Scud missile launcher parts from North Korea to Iran via Kyiv, in 1995. “That was a long time ago and I know nothing about it,” said Kaplyunenko.

Antonov Aerotrack was a partly state-owned company that has ties with leading Ukrainian aviation and defence producers such as legendary plane producer Antonov, and Progress turbine builder from Zaporizhzhya.

But besides the links to the state, Antonov Aerotrack also had links to alleged organised crime structures: Ukraine’s company register shows that a significant stake in the business was held by a notorious Viennese company, Nordex GmbH, run by Grigory Loutchansky, a legendary figure from the 1990s. “The CIA reported that it [Nordex] deals in various schemes from illegal arms trading to money laundering for the Russian mob,” the US embassy in Kyiv wrote in a Crime Digest circular from April 1999.

Although based in Vienna, and often associated in the media with Russia, Nordex had strong Ukrainian links: Loutchansky’s partner in Nordex was Israeli-Ukrainian oligarch Vadim Rabinovich, according to Rabinovich’s own testimony in an authorised biography. GST Ukraine’s Kaplyunenko said that his company had no connection to Nordex or Rabinovich.

In 1996, CIA sources told Time magazine that in 1995 Nordex had flown Scud missile launcher parts from North Korea to Iran, using a Ukrainian-registered Antonov Aerotrack plane, via Kyiv. CIA sources were also quoted as saying said that Nordex had transferred nuclear materials to Iran in 1993-94.

Loutchansky admitted having visited North Korea and owning the plane, but said he had nothing to do with the cargo, because the plane was leased at the time to a Bulgarian firm. Rabinovich, when asked about the incident in his biography, added that Nordex was at the time no longer owner of the plane at the time, having sold it to Aerotrack.

Rabinovich, in an early 2014 interview with Russia’s radio station Ekho Moskvy, made light of past allegations of arms trading, such as in 2001 having sold 300 tanks to the Taliban via Pakistan. “At that time, for the first time ever, the Ukrainian state stood up for me: the head of the National Security Council declared that we simply didn’t have that many tanks,” Rabinovich said. He also reminisced: “I once left my hotel in Jerusalem holding a paper with the headline ‘Rabinovich sold arms to Iran.’ A local saw the headline, my picture and me, and said: ‘Congratulations!'” His advice to journalists? “Write what you want about me, but get my name right.”

Loose nukes

Underlining the Iran connection, GST Ukraine’s apparent partner firm, Kazakh company GST Aero/East Wing, is also alleged to have smuggled nuclear-capable cruise missiles stolen from Ukraine’s arsenals to Iran in 2001.

Ukraine’s SBU intelligence service announced in January 2005 that it had identified a gang that had stolen the missiles and smuggled them out in 2001. In a newspaper interview in 2005, the defence lawyer for the sole defendant – a certain Vladimir Evdokimov – mentioned that the cruise missiles had been flown to Iran in 2001 by GST Aero. The trial was held in secret.

While the SBU investigation remains under wraps, in 2004 Ukrainian MP Hrihory Omelchenko, himself a former police investigator, used his powers as head of Ukraine’s parliamentary committee against organised crime to launch his own investigation, which bne was able to view in the archives of the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament.

Some offshore structures involved in the 2001 deal, according to Omelchenko’s investigation, are still active today. For instance, according to Omelchenko’s investigation, a Cyprus firm, Volgen Trading, financed post-sale visits by Ukrainian experts to service the cruise missiles in Iran.

According to the Cyprus company register, Volgen Trading was reactivated in October 2014 – and now features as director a man with the same name, Vladimir Evdokimov – as the defendant in the 2005 trial. A recent listing for Volgen Trading on social media describes the firm as involved in air cargo.

Ukraine’s company register shows that at the time of the alleged Iran missile shipment in 2001, Volgen Trading was a shareholder in Orlan Beverages concern, founded by businessman and politician Yevhen Chervonenko. At the time Chervonenko headed Ukraine’s agency for state reserves, in 2005 he headed the transport ministry, later becoming governor of Zaporizhzhya region, and from 2010 headed the aviation department at Ukraine’s emergencies ministry. Chervonenko, widely regarded as an ally of Rabinovich, says he quit his business Orlan Beverages as early as 1997 on becoming an adviser to then president Leonid Kuchma. Volgen Trading ownership is hidden behind nominees, and phone numbers listed for the company did not work.

Mysterious Mr Salamatin

Rabinovich is still going strong 20 years on, running as an outsider in presidential elections in May 2014 and getting elected to parliament on October 26. The press service of his political party Centre said he is not available for comment before the opening of parliament at a still undetermined date. His known business interests focus on media.

Loutchansky in contrast has disappeared from public view and is believed to live in Israel. Loutchansky’s name – and the memory of the now defunct Nordex – echoed in 2010-2012, however, due to the bizarre rise through Ukraine’s defence establishment of a certain Dmitry Salamatin, who in 2010 out of the blue was named head of Ukraine’s arms export Ukrspetseksport, and in 2011 became minister of defence.

Salamatin’s origins were in Kazakhstan and Russia, and he is believed to have only received Ukrainian citizenship days before he entered Ukraine’s parliament in 2006, remaining largely unknown until his shock appointment in 2010.

Salamatin swiftly consolidated Ukraine’s sprawling defence producers and export firms, uniting them in a new holding structure called Ukroboronprom – which he then headed. Having done this in the space of a year, in 2011 then president Viktor Yanukovych made Salamatin defence minister. Then Yanukovych dropped him in December 2012, and Salamatin has never been heard of since in Ukraine.  “The day after he was fired, he flew back to Moscow, where his family had remained,” says Oleksiy Melnik, defence expert at Kyiv’s Razumkov Centre.

Salamatin’s activity as Ukraine’s defence sector head may be the main focus of the ongoing investigation into Ukroboronprom. “His main interest was clearly the arms trade, and as defence minister he used Ukraine’s military mostly as a marketing instrument to sell weapons systems, with an eye to his own benefit,” says Melnik. “At the same time he was likely linked to Russian special services.” Salamatin could not be reached for comment.

So who was he? Salamatin’s qualification to head Ukraine’s defence sector may have derived from his 1990s Nordex ties. In 1994 Nordex entered a consortium to manage giant Kazakh steel producer Karmet, together with a US company, according to Time in 1996. Loutchansky was backed in this by two partners: Kazakh mining minister at the time Albert Salamatin, and Russian deputy prime minister Oleg Soskovets, also of Kazakh origin. Albert Salamatin is Dmitry’s father, while Oleg Soskovets is widely reported to be Salamatin’s father-in-law. The Kazakh deal ultimately failed, because the US government blocked Nordex involvement, according to Time.