Graham Stack in Bucharest for Business New Europe (www.businessneweurope.eu)
With the third tranche of IMF funding for Romania on hold until a new government is in place and willing to meet IMF criteria, Romania will have to turn to the domestic market to fund outstanding expenditure in 2009. Analysts anticipate a resulting liquidity drain that will stall recovery.
As anticipated, the collapse of Romania’s grand coalition government October 13 in the run-up to tightly-contested presidential elections November 22 has made it impossible for the IMF to disburse the third, 1.5bn euro tranche of a 20bn euro stand-by loan agreed in April. An additional 1bn euro tranche of financial support from the EC was also tied in to IMF approval.
“(I)n the current political environment crucial components of the policy package cannot yet be implemented. Most important, the interim government cannot legally submit the 2010 budget to parliament, nor can it undertake the actions needed to trim the 2010 deficit to the 5.9 percent of GDP deficit target. The Fiscal Responsibility Law and Pension Reform cannot yet be agreed and approved by parliament,” was the IMF’s official description of the situation November 6.
With the budget deficit likely to hit over 8% of GDP by year end, adviser to Central Bank governor Adrian Vasilescu was quoted by media as saying that the government needs 5bn euros by year end.
This puts Romania in a catch-22 situation. With the presidential elections likely to go into a second round December 6, no party is going to take responsibility for the cuts needed to downsize the budget. But the failure to countenance these cuts means that the main anticipated source of funding spending – IMF et al – has been lost. And the only alternative –expensive government borrowing on the domestic market – will drain liquidity that should be restarting the economy, thus prolonging the recession.
“Printing money is out of the question without a foreign exchange cover,” says Melania Hancila, chief economist at Volksbank Romania, “therefore the only financing resource remains for the moment the domestic market, however the cost of borrowing will be significantly higher, probably double, inducing an extra burden on Romania’s debt service. The public sector will drain up the excess liquidity in the banking system, leaving scarce financing available for the private sector, further delaying the recovery of the real economy.”
“Even if we got the money from IMF/EU, says Nicolaie Alexandru, chief economist at ING Romania, “it would have been still difficult to finance the budget deficit as those amounts were unlikely to cover liquidity needs during these two months.”
“It is going to be a tough job,” Alexandru predicts, agreeing with the figure of 5bn euros funding requirements for November and December. “It might be that the Ministry of Finance pays more than a maximum of 10% for RON securities before the end of this year, but even this would not suffice. The rest of the spending is likely to be delayed with arrears and the pressure on the 2010 budget is to increase.”
“Clearly pressure on yields will grow, as issuance needs rise, says Pasquale Diana of Morgen Stanley. “Also, there will be pressures on the RON to weaken, the NBR will be active in the foreign exchange market, market rates will go up and the easing cycle will stall indefinitely.”
Killing with kindness?
As the crisis struck Eastern Europe, and the IMF re-entered the scene like a blast from the past, the institution was keen to reassure populations and show that it had taken on board criticism of policies in the 1990s. Notoriously, former World Bank deputy head and Nobel Prize holder Joseph Stiglitz lashed the IMF for imposing too harsh austerity measures on borrowers during the Asian crisis 1997, thus prolonging the crisis and provoking political instability.
This time round, the IMF has done the opposite: directly financing budget deficits, despite its articles limiting its remit to balance of payment crises. One third of Romania’s IMF money is assigned to finance the deficit.
Critics are now arguing the IMF could have got more reform for its money.
With IMF programmes going off-track in both Romania and Ukraine, where wide-open presidential races are fuelling populist politics, accusations are being made that the IMF has encouraged moral hazard in the form of expansionist budgets that will prolong the recession as surely as sweeping austerity measures.
“The IMF has not been tough on Romania, quite the opposite,” argues Morgan Stanley’s Diana.
“The institution increased moral hazard here,” says Alexandru, “and it is likely to face very strong opposition to any harsh measures it may try to impose on Romania early next year – as these unsympathetic measures are unavoidable given no real reform measures were implemented so far and the fiscal imbalance is growing in Romania.”
The argument for both Romania and Ukraine is that governments when applying for IMF aid were ready to make more commitments than the IMF demanded from them. When the IMF went for conditionality–lite, and as elections dates approach, local politicians lost their fear of the institution, and thought they could take it for a ride, reneging on budget deficit targets and other reform measures promised. In both Ukraine and Romania, the IMF has now quit the game, but not before the damage has been done – in anticipation of IMF funding, budgets deficits are huge, and will lead to downwards pressure on the currency, drying up of domestic liquidity and payment arrears, in the worst case printing money.
This is also of course linked to the specifics of the political process in both Romania and Ukraine. In both countries, there is no majority in parliament, and both countries are going into presidential elections – Romania in November, Ukraine in January, – that polls show are wide open. Because no top politician in either country can be sure of being in office a few months from now, there is no reason to take responsibility for the situation. But whoever gets in, is going to have to deal with the mess, and cuts will then be harsher than if they had been implemented earlier.
“Therefore, the recession is likely to be longer than we expected and tighter fiscal policies might have a bigger negative impact on growth for three to four years from now. If there is no recovery in 2010, things could become even more complicated,” concludes Alexandru gloomily.